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The Expert Cure? Exploring the Restorative Potential of Expertise for Public Satisfaction with 
Parties 
Dr Katharine Dommett and Dr Luke Temple, University of Sheffield 
The declining legitimacy of political parties has become something of a truism in 
political science discourse. Less often reflected upon is how these legitimacy 
problems could potentially be resolved. This article contributes to this 
underexplored issue by examining the restorative potential of expertise as a 
supplement to intra-party democracy. Building on an established literature on 
Stealth Democracy we explore the potential for expert-inspired reforms to boost 
ǯ   Ǥ Using original survey questions, we provide 
evidence that a perceived lack of expert engagement in parties predicts citizen 
dissatisfaction, before using deliberative workshop data to distil traits that 
define the appeal of experts and expertise. This mixed-methods approach allows 
us to demonstrate some common desires of which parties should be aware, but 
also traits that make these ideas difficult to realise. Combining these insights, we 
argue that whilst expertise has appeal, parties face considerable challenges in 
satisfying citizensǯǤ 
Key Words: Experts; Technocracy; Parties; Public Perceptions 
Across new and advanced democracies, it has been widely reported    Ǯ  ǯȋǡ  ? ? ? ?:  ? ? ?Ȍ Ǯ
increasingly sceptical about partisan ǯ ȋ  ǡ  ? ? ?0: 3). Citing data on 
party membership, electoral turnout, public satisfaction and trust, successive scholars have argued  Ǯ           with political 
parǥ the evidence points increasingly and unequivocally to the decline of parties as ǯȋǡ ? ? ? ?: 334). Whilst there have been recent fluctuations 
in party membership in the UK (Audickas, Dempsey and Keen, 2018), there remain many indicators 
that parties are held in low regard. Results from seven rounds of the European Social Survey from 
between 2004 and 2016 demonstrate that average party trust in the UK has constantly hovered 
around a very weak 3.6 out of ten. Most recently, Ignazi (2017: 172) has documented how issues of 
party legitimacy remain deeply problematic across Europe. The challenge facing political parties 
therefore appears considerable.  
A common response to charges that party legitimacy is decreasing in the eyes of the public has been 
to explore ways of stimulating wider citizen participation (Faucher, 2014; Gauja, 2016) with the 
hope that this will help improve public perceptions. In contrast, in this article we bring together 
scholarship on declining party democracy with the finding that the notion of Ǯexpertiseǯs public 
appeal. This might seem counterintuitive during a time in which populist discourse frames experts 
as elites and therefore not to be trusted (Clarke and Newman 2017). Presenting original survey 
data, we show that in fact there is a broadly positive link between satisfaction and perceptions of 
expertise in parties. However, our mixed-methods approach allows us to rigorously examine this 
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finding - using deliberative workshop data to unpack this idea, we outline the considerable 
challenges that parties face in realising citizens desires for expertise. These findings suggest that 
expertise is, as Newman and Clarke (2018) have argued,  Ǯǯ as it is, contingent, 
contested, and shaped by context. Rather than unanimously embracing experts, or rejecting them in 
favour of populists, the public therefore have complex views of these actors and their potential 
contribution to democratic governance. Exploring these ideas, this article moves forward the 
debate surrounding party legitimacy and public opinion whilst also laying out the implications of ǯfor practitioners seeking to capitalise on the public appeal of expertise.  
Models of Governance 
Despite current travails, since the collapse of the Soviet Union multi-party democracy has provided 
perhaps the dominant model of state governance. In the ideal model, parties act as intermediaries 
between citizens and the state (Lawson, 1980). Serving as both representative and governing 
organisations, parties provide Ǯdemocratic linkageǯ between people and government, bridging the  ǯȋǡ  ? ? ? ?:  ? ? ?ȌǤǡǮǯȋ ? ? ? ?: 512). In principal-agent terms, parties act as the agents for members, 
electors or the wider public (dependent on your conception of party organization), channelling the 
interests of these groups into governing outcomes. The legitimacy of parties to exercise such 
governing power is bound up with procedures of representative democracy. Operating within 
voting systems, parties are authorized and held to account through competitive elections that give 
citizens equal opportunity to grant and withdraw a political mandate (Lipset, 1959). It is on this 
basis that parties claim that their exercise of power is rightful and why, as Beetham argues, those 
subject to it have a corresponding duty to obey (2004: 107). Whilst the nature of party 
representation is seen to have changed over time - moving from a system of mass participation to 
cartelised competition (Katz and Mair, 1995) - ǯremains founded upon 
the idea that they     Ǯ     ȏȐ ǯȋǡ ? ? ? ?: 311).  
In contrast to a system of party democracy, the technocratic approach is somewhat less defined 
(Centeno, 1993: 309) and often, as Hanley (2018) points out, is simply described as the Ǯreverse 
mirror imageǯ   ǯ  definition of party government. As an ideal type, 
technocracies are seen to govern in accordance with the knowledge and experience of Ǯexpertsǯ. In 
contrast to party democracy, this model does not draw on mass participation or popular 
representation, but instead argues that an expert, ruling elite discerns Ǯǡǡǯ ȋǡ  ? ? ? ?: 60). Technocrats accordingly u Ǯ-free, objective criteria for  ǯ ȋǡ 1993: 11) that are rationalised to be in the public interest. A 
technocratic government does not act on a mandate derived from the electoral participation of the 
populace (Ibid: 63), but rather from an assurance ǮȏȐȏ
population] is protected from the undue influence of pa ǯ ȋǡ 1993: 133). 
Technocratic legitimacy is therefore ǮǯǮǲǳ     ǯ ȋǣ 313). This approach is grounded by Ǯthe 
(undeniably intuitive) claim that experts are better equipped than citizens to make informed 
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judgements concerning complex political problems, [which] lends knowledge and ǲevidenceǳ the 
last and leading word in politicsǯ (Wolkenstein 2015: 116). The governing class are accordingly   Ǯ     ǯ   
might be considered realised    Ǯ       
administratorǥȏȐselfless dischaǯȋ 1987: 437).  
Emerging from these accounts are very different visions for how representation and governance 
occur that reify different types of actor and different sources of knowledge as legitimate; creating 
alternative benchmarks for acceptable governing practices. The relevance of these two models for 
this article lies in the crisis party democracies are currently seen to face. As successive studies have 
shown, parties face growing questions about their legitimacy in the light of declining levels of 
participation and a growth in negative political attitudes (Inglehart, 1997; Pharr, Putnam & Dalton, 
2000; van Biezen, 2008; van Biezen and Poguntke, 2014; Webb, 2013). In response, scholars and 
practitioners have examined the potential for novel participatory avenues or engagement practices 
(Faucher, 2014; Gauja, 2016). In this article we direct attention to existing work that has 
demonstrated the attraction many citizens feel to the idea of depoliticised decision-making, experts 
and expertise. Although recognised in political surveys, we argue that, to date, limited attention has 
been paid to the potential cross-fertilisation of these approaches. For this reason, we explore the 
potential for parties to capitalise on the appeal of experts and expertise, ǯ
(2018: 82) observation that ǮȋȌ
additional non-elective ǯ (emphasis added).  
Public perceptions of experts 
The idea of expert-led governance has received some attention in public opinion surveys. For 
example, the World Values Survey Ǯǡǡ            ǯǤ  
(and others like it) have tended to find consistent support for experts; in 2014, 55% answered that 
it was Ǯveryǯ or Ǯfairlyǯ good for experts, not government, to make decisions (across the 59 countries 
surveyed). In a similar way, the Eurobarometer found that 77% tended to agree or strongly agree  Ǯ         ǯ ȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǤ    
context, Moss et al. (2016: 454) used Mass Observation archives to find historical evidence that Ǯǯ-ǮǯǡǮǯǡǮǯǮǯǤWorth noting however 
is that such sentiment is not distributed equally across populations; for instance, in their study of 
27 European countries, Bertsou and Pastorella (2017) link such support with low levels of political 
trust and living in a formerly communist state. 
This idea of outsourcing to experts forms an integral part of the Ǯ ǯargument made 
by Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2002). In a study of US ǯ perceptions on decision-making, 
they found that: Ǯǥthe general notion of a dedicated bureaucratic elite calling the shots on the means 
to achieve the consensual ends, even if there is not direct accountability to the 
people, is attractiveǯȋ ? ? ? ?: 141). 
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Furthermore, they argued that: ǮPeople would most prefer decisions to be made by what we call empathetic, non-
self-interested decision makers...The people are surprisingly smitten with the 
notion of elite experts making choicesǯ(Ibid: 86). 
Although they found that these views were not unanimously held, a significant minority felt this 
way (with, for example, 31% of Americans agreeing Ǯ-elected ǯȋIbid: 138)). These conclusions suggest that experts and expertise have appeal, but there 
remain questions about how and why expertise and experts are valued. These questions are 
particularly interesting in the context of recent debates about post-truth and suggestions Ȃ often 
raised by populist narratives Ȃ that elite knowledge should be challenged (Fuller, 2018; Van 
Zoonen, 2012).  
Existing work interrogating attitudes towards experts has tended to examine the type of experts ǯ ǡ
(comparing, for example, technocratic ideals with populism or representative governance). In the 
former tradition, Hibbing and Theiss-Morse showed that experts have appeal when they strive to Ǯ  ǯ     Ǯhave nothing to gain from selecting one option over 
anotherǯ. Also in the US context, VanderMolen (2017) used survey analysis to explore public views 
of  ǡ        Ǯ   
specific kind of non-elected expertise. Outside of business leaders, the public would prefer to elect 
representati           ǯ
(VanderMolen 2017: 694).  
In the second tradition, scholars have shown differing levels of support for experts. Webb (2013), 
for example, found that in the UK context,  ? ?Ǥ ? ? ǮȏȐ
their elected representatives to have the final say in running government, rather than leaving it up   ǯ ȋ ? ? ? ?ǣ753). In demonstrating support for representative government, ǯ indings complicate questions about the kind of democracy citizens would like to see. 
Interrogating these desires in depth is important because, as Font et al. (2015: 168) have ǡǮ
current socio-political climate is rendering increasingly important the tension between citizen 
demands for more participatory opportunities and international shifts towards more technocratic 
decision-ǯǤǯhave therefore been shown to be multi-dimensional, 
reflecting a desire for configurations of participatory, representative and expert-based governance. 
In the analysis that follows, we present new data ǯ
detail. Unlike previous analysis, we do not look at preferences for experts as sole governors, or at 
the relative appeal of technocracy. Rather, we consider attitudes towards experts in the context of 
parties. Given the crisis facing parties, we ask whether experts are viewed positively in the context 
of parties, and whether an absence of expertise is related to negative views of parties as a whole. 	ǯ
we go on to distil the traits that define the appeal of experts and expertise and demonstrate the 
presence of not only very particular desires, but also of contradictory ideas. Combining these 
insights, we explore the potential for political parties to exploit the appeal of expertise and argue 
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that whilst some principles might be distilled, parties will find it difficult to capitalise on the appeal 
of this ideaǡ       ǯ      
expertise.   
Methods 
We present data collected in a multi-stranded programme of public opinion research designed to      Ǥ        ǯ
perceptions of parties, we collected quantitative and qua ǯ
views. This approach sought to reflect the contingent nature of public opinion and utilised trade-off 
questions and deliberative discussion to identify the tensions ǯǤ
Specifically, the survey data presented below was collected by the polling company YouGov from 
UK adults. Valid responses were gathered from 1,497 people between the 17th and 21st of 
November 2017.1 The data presented is weighted in accordance with YouGov measures to 
extrapolate a national representative sample from respondents. To complement the survey data, 
deliberative workshops were   ǯ Ǥ
were held in Sheffield in January and February 2018. Each had a different composition, with one 
composed of those with no former engagement with political parties, a second group composed of 
party activists and campaigners, and a final group composed of a 50/50 split of the prior two 
groups. In total 68 people participated, with as similar number of people in each session. Each 
workshop saw individuals engage in small group discussion in order to construct their ideal party, 
with interventions and facilitation used to probe and explore responses. This data was transcribed 
and analysed in NVivo. References to experts or expertise were collated across the five activities 
that structured the workshop, providing a corpus of data on attitudes towards experts in regards to 
policy-making, participation and governance. This data was then re-coded to identify three key 
themes (discussed below) that relate to who an expert is, what they do, and how they relate to a 
political party. This two-pronged approach allows us to offer complementary analyses; first, 
diagnosing views of experts and expertise within parties, and second,  ǯ
understanding of these terms.  
The role of expertise in parties  
To build on existing research, our ǯǡ
with a specific focus on these ideas in the context of parties. We initially examined the extent to 
which experts as opposed to other actors were seen to be a desirable influence on party policy. We 
therefore asked respondents to what extent parties should ideally think about the views of different 
groups when they developed their policy positions. We gave respondents the option to specify their 
views about multiple groups: asking them about experts and three groups associated with party 
democracy Ȃ namely the majority of the public, party members and electorally significant voters.2    
                                               
1 Valid responses here were determined according to the time taken to answer questions. Those respondents 
who took less than 5 minutes to answer the questions were excluded from analysis on the basis that it was 
not possible to read the questions (let alone answer them) in less time than this.  
2 We also have two additional responses: ǮǯǮȋȌǯǡǡǡǤ 
6 
Figure 1: ǮNow thinking about how political parties should ideally behave, when parties develop their 
policy positions how often should they think about the opinion of each of the following groups?ǯ  
 
From results presented in Figure 1 we see strong support for experts: 50% wanted to see experts 
listened to more than half or almost all of the time. This group statistically out-performed potential 
voters (43%) and party members (39%). Interestingly, experts are not the only favoured group. 
The idea that the majority of the public should be listened to more than half of the time is the most 
strongly held, suggesting respondents see the appeal of multiple groups simultaneously informing 
policy formation. Indeed, if we compare respondent results across their answers (not shown), we 
find the same: 41% of respondents chose more than half/almost all the time for both experts and 
the public, and 27% chose the same for both experts and party members. Experts are seen to be an 
important influence on policy-making, yet for many people this support might not come at the 
expense of other constituencies associated with party democracy. Survey responses do not, 
however, allow us to effectively explore whether such responses reflect genuine beliefs of 
compatibility, or ǮǯȋZaller 1992). On this basis, there are 
grounds for further exploring any potential compatibility of technocratic ideas within existing 
systems of party democracy through our workshop data.  
Before we take up this challenge, and given concerns about party legitimacy, we also asked 
respondents who they thought parties currently listened to (as opposed to the ideal). Adopting an 
expectations gap approach (Kimball and Patterson, 1997), we subtracted perceived realities from 
desires to determine whether ǯ       . The results, 
presented in Figure 2, suggest that a very similar percentage of respondents think experts, voters, 
and members were listened to the desired amount (between 29% and 31%). However, a 
considerable majority of respondents (77%) think the public are being listened to less than desired, 
                                                                                                                                                       
The second question asked: In your opinion, when parties develop their policy positions, how often do they 
think about the opinion of the following groups? (for each statement please tick one). For both questions the 
scale ran as follows: 1= Almost never, 2= Less than half of the time, 3= About half the time, 4=More than half ǡ ? ?ǡǯǤ 
17
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7
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50
65
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16
Party
Members
Potential
Voters
Experts
Majority of
the Public
Less than Half the Time / Almost Never Half the time
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with experts again the clear second-largest group here, at 56%. Experts therefore sit half-way 
between attitudes towards the majority of the public on one hand, and voters and party members 
on the other. 
Figure 2: Calculated expectations gaps for who political parties listen to when making decisions 
 
Having reviewed public attitudes concerning what sources parties should consider when they 
formulate policy, our next step explores the relationship between these judgements and satisfaction 
with political parties. As mentioned at the outset, negative attitudes towards political parties are 
widespread and have been linked to a weakening satisfaction with parties and a need for reform 
(van Biezen, 2008). A popular response has been for parties to open up their participatory 
structures to empower party members, strengthening links between citizens and parties (Gauja 
2016: 103). However, these steps have often been taken without examining the drivers of 
dissatisfaction and the degree to which more participatory opportunities are desired. Where 
studies of satisfaction have occurred, these have tended to focus on satisfaction Ǯǯ
the system level rather than focusing on parties (see Martin 2014). Noting these trends, we ask 
whether there is a relationship between responses to the above questions and satisfaction with 
parties. In particular, we explore whether peǯ
less satisfied than others, a finding that would support the case for parties devoting attention to 
experts and expertise. Therefore, we constructed a logistic regression to examine the 23% of our 
reǮǯǮǯȋcoded as Ǯ ?ǯǮǯǯȌǡǮǯǮǯ satisfied. 
Because we expect existing party preferences may colour attitudes towards political parties more 
generally, we control for party support, strength of partisanship and left-right ideology in our 
model. We also explored key demographic and attitudinal correlates utilised by existing studies 
through the inclusion of age, gender, education, class and attention to politics (Carman, 2006; 
Dennis, 1966; Martin, 2014; James, 2009; Seyd, 2016; Webb, 2013). We added our own specific 
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measure of political knowledge, asking respondents about their perceived knowledge of how 
parties work to get more insight into understanding of knowledge of these particular 
organisations.3 Finally, for the purposes of our focus, the results of most interest are those for the 
expectation gaps. In each case the variable is categorised as in Figure 2, with the reference category 
being those who think the group are listened to the desired amount. 
 
Table 1: Logistic regression model examining respondents who are very/fairly satisfied with political 
parties (coded 1) in comparison to those who are not very/not at all satisfied (coded 0) 
 
Explaining satisfaction with political parties Coefficient s.e. 
Gender (ref = male) 0.04 (0.17) 
Age (years) 0.00 (0.01) 
Attended university (ref = did not attend) -0.39** (0.18) 
   
Social Grade (ref = A/B)   
C1 -0.10 (0.22) 
C2 -0.94*** (0.27) 
D/E -0.23 (0.24) 
   
Party Knowledge (ref = A great deal)   
A fair amount 0.32 (0.51) 
Not very much 0.33 (0.52) 
Nothing at all -0.17 (0.63) ǯ -0.08 (0.79) 
   
Political attention (0-10) 0.03 (0.04) 
Left Right (ref = Centre)   
Left 0.04 (0.27) 
Right -0.22 (0.26) ǯ -0.18 (0.30) 
   
Party support (ref=No party)   
Conservative 0.77* (0.27) 
Labour -0.27 (0.40) 
Liberal Democrat -0.25 (0.49) 
UKIP -0.42 (0.61) 
Green Party -0.13 (0.61) 
Other party -1.41** (0.64) ǯ -0.49 (0.48) 
   
Strength of Party Support (ref = Very Strong)   
Fairly strong -0.15 (0.26) 
Not very strong -0.87** (0.31) ǯ -0.35 (0.79) 
Not applicable -0.98* (0.55) 
   
Experts expectations (ref= Listened to as desired)   
Listen less than desired -0.52** (0.21) 
Listen more desired -0.43* (0.25) 
   
                                               
3 ǡǣǮHow much, if anything, do you feel you know about the following:  
How political parties work: Scale: 1= A great deal, 2= A fair amount, 3= Not very much, 4= Nothing at all, 5= I 
ǯǤǯ 
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Members expectations (ref= Listened to as desired)   
Listen less than desired 0.32 (0.23) 
Listen more desired 0.39* (0.25) 
   
Potential Voters expectations (ref= Listened to as desired)   
Listen less than desired -0.05 (0.21) 
Listen more desired -0.17 (0.21) 
   
Majority of the public expectations (ref= Listened to as desired)   
Listen less than desired -0.69** (0.24) 
Listen more desired 0.51 (0.37) 
   
n=1,057   Ƭǯ ? ? ?Ǥ ? ?   
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.001 
 
Results indicate that demographic and general political attitudinal measures have limited 
predictive power when it comes to satisfaction with parties. Matching findings on satisfaction with 
democracy (Norris 2011: 201) those with a university degree are less likely to be satisfied with 
parties in comparison to those without a degree (b=-0.39, p<0.05). Age, gender, perceived political 
knowledge of how parties work, left-right placement, and political attention were insignificant. 
Class was only significant for the C2 category who were less likely than the A/B group to be 
satisfied with parties (b=-0.94, p<0.001). At a lower level of significance, our party support measure 
does suggest that Conservative supporters were more satisfied, compared to those who supported 
no party (b=0.77, p<0.10ȌǤ  Ǯǯ  
dissatisfied (b=-1.41, p<0.05) and further analysis suggests this result is driven by supporters of the 
SNP. In relation to the Conservative result, it is suggested that we are likely picking up something of  Ǯǯ ǯ   ȋAnderson & Guillory 1997), as the Conservative Party was in 
government at the time of the survey. 
When it comes to expectations gaps, there is no significant relationship between party satisfaction 
and a belief that parties listen to potential voters more or less than desired. As we might expect, 
there is a clear result for the wider public Ȃ those who think the public are listened to less than they 
should by parties are less likely to be satisfied with parties (b=-0.69, p<0.05). There is a weaker 
effect for listening to members and in an unanticipated direction Ȃ those who think parties listen to 
members more than they would desire are more satisfied with parties (b=0.39, p<0.1). This provides 
some evidence that dissatisfaction with parties is not necessarily driven by those with concerns 
that members are not having enough say or influence on policy. Our key results for listening to 
experts are interesting. In comparison to those who think experts are listened to the desired 
amount, there is evidence that those who think experts are listened to more than desired (b=-0.43, 
p<0.1) and those who think experts are less than desired (b=0-52, p<0.05) are significantly less 
likely to be satisfied with parties.  
Our model therefore provides evidence that public attitudes concerning the way that parties utilise 
experts and expertise in their policy-making is associated with levels of satisfaction towards 
political parties. There is evidence that too little or too much perceived engagement with experts 
can tarnish citizen judgements. Reviewing the findings from our survey analysis, we therefore echo 
10 
Hibbing and Thesis-Morse by finding that a proportion of the public view experts and expertise 
positively. However, our findings also point towards complication in terms of just how experts 
might be utilised by political parties as they suggest that expertise is not viewed in uniformly 
positive terms. Given that scholarship from Science and Technology Studies has acknowledged the 
very different responses to ǮȏȐ  ȏȐ       ǡ  
they play in society and what role they should playǯ
whether there are consistent conceptions of experts and expertise, and whether certain types of 
expert are viewed in more favourable ways (Grundmann 2017: 25). For this reason, we turn to our 
qualitative data to present more detailed evidence of how citizens view experts and expertise.   
Public Desires for Expertise in Political Parties 
Our workshop data indicated further generalised support for our survey findings. Participants in 
each of our workshops were split into smaller groups of 4-5 individuals, giving a total of 15 groups. 
Each of these 15 groups was then given the task of deciding which actors they thought should 
inform policy-making. Groups were asked to generate a list of different types of people they would 
like to see involved and then were given additional prompts (one of which was experts) that they 
could decide to include or reject in their list. Each of the 15 groups listed experts or independent 
advisors before being given the prompts, and subsequently experts were referenced in positive 
terms, demonstrating the appeal of this idea. In coding responses, however, it became clear that 
participants had some different preferences when it came to how parties might use experts and 
expertise and who constituted an (legitimate) expert. Three distinctive themes were distilled that 
related to:  
1. The role of the expert  
2. Who counts as an expert  
3. Expert status and partisan affiliation  
Wǯhighlight preferences before turning to discuss whether it is possible for 
parties to ǯǤ 
The role of the expert in parties  
The role of experts and expertise in parties can vary. Outside of technocratic systems in which 
experts have ultimate control, a range of powers and capacities can be taken up. Existing 
scholarship has recognised that experts can provide information and spread understanding 
amongst the general populace (Turner, 2001). As Schudson (2006: 500) argues, experts can play a   Ǯ   
both legislators and the general public to engage effectively in democratic decision-ǯǤ 
experts can have differing degrees of personal (or collective) power, meaning there are 
circumstances where experts themselves have decision-making power. Within their discussions, 
participants recognised these possibilities and often had strong views about the desirability of each. 
Specifically, participants distinguished between experts as sources of information, as formulators of 
policy options, and as decision-makers in their own right, using these divisions to indicate 
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preferences for the former and concern over experts being given decision-making power. Three key 
themes emerged. 
First, many participants explicitly linked their support for experts to the idea that these actors can 
provide invaluable information. It was therefore argued that ǲaccurate information 
to        ǳ. From this view, it was contended that in an ideal 
party, actors other than experts w ǲresearchers to 
look into it, and depending on what you find you formulate policy, you can't formulate your policy 
 ǡ  ǫǳ. Voiced routinely throughout the three workshops, these kinds of 
statements demonstrated the appeal of experts as sources of information who are engaged by other 
party actors to clarify their understanding and inform decisions.  
Second, and related to the above, a number of participants also cited expertsǯ value as formulators 
of policy options. Discussing policy-making specifically, participants made comments such as: "I 
would want the experts     ǳ. Rather than just providing information to 
party actors who make policies, experts would therefore play a role in proposing, narrowing down 
and evaluating alternative ideas. Experts would therefore be determining ǲwhat is doable and what 
isn't doable" and presenting parties with options of what should be done. For some participants this 
meant that experts played an important part in broader policy and decision-making processes, with Ǯpanel of expertsǥ narrowing [options] downǳ.  
Finally, discussion also revealed important differences around expertsǯ role in decision-making. 
Although a minority argued that it ǲexperts in the field making policy, because 
anyone can come up with a policy, but it can be completely wrong" and that "[i]t is a real shame that 
you have got to go beyond the experts isn't it [when making decisions]", the overwhelming consensus 
was that experts should not make decisions themselves, and that party members and/or elites 
should retain decision-making power.  It was therefore argued that: 
 ?  ǡ   ǯ    ǥ   
ǳand that "experts can only advise though, not make decisionsǳǤ 
Some felt "I don't think the experts should be voting on it so much as informing and conversing with 
ǳ, whilst others noted: "I think once a policy has been mooted they should provide input, and 
they should maybe be given higher priority than the public, but I am not sure that experts should be 
making policies". 
On this basis it appears that both politically active and non-active participants are comfortable with 
the idea of experts informing parties and aiding the formulation of policies and decisions, but that 
many have concerns about experts being given sole decision-making power. This suggests that 
there is support for integrating experts into existing party systems, but that there are preferences 
for precisely how this should be done that parties need to understand. Our work therefore echoes 
the finding of Ganuza et al. (2017: 270) that most people view ǯ Ǯto advise politicians ǯ.  
Who counts as an expert in parties 
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In addition to preferences over what experts did, workshop discussion also revealed important 
differences in who was seen as a valid source of expertise. Participants frequently admitted to being 
ǲǳ, asking questions like ǲǡ
self-styled experts?ǳǤǣ 
ǲǫ ? 
 "Anyone who can help us!" 
ǥ ?ow what they are talking about". 
The term expert is notoriously hard to classify and scholars have adopted different definitions. 
Whilst some have identified expert attributes, others have focused on the relationship between the 
users and consumers of expertise. Grundmann defines an expert as a specialist, noting that Ǯǯ(2017: 26). So, experts can  Ǯ      ǯǡ Ǯ  ǡ    ǯ  Ǯ      ǯ (Ibid). These ideas 
resonated in the comments of participants and provide important insight into who citizens would 
like to be informing parties activities. Our analysis identified 3 factors as influential:  
1. Qualifications 
2. Professional Expertise 
3. Personal Expertise 
For nearly all participants, qualifications were an important condition of expert status because 
otherwise it was argued that: ǲanybody researching can become an expert". The idea of qualifications  ǡ ǡ ǲ[What] I find so scary about current 
party policy is that the policies are made by people who seem to have no qualifications in the areas 
ǳǤǲ-ǳ"academics", and were explicitly mentioned in commentǣǲI would like 
people to be involved in making policies to actually have some experience, some qualifications, and 
some evidence behind the ideas, rather than just an ideology". And yet, as this comment reveals, 
qualifications alone are not the only factor: the idea of experience also played a role. It was argued 
that ǯ: "If we go with academics you can potentially know how an 
aircraft carrier works, but do they know how to drive it?".  
Experience is, then, a complex idea, and ǯ comments revealed a range of desirable 
characteristics. Some emphasised the fact that experts needed to have professional expertise. Often 
connected to qualifications or status, the idea that doctors, nurses, shopkeepers, heart surgeons and 
artists were experts was commonly voiced. These individuals were seen to qualify as experts 
because they were "Professionals in that field" ǲclinical experience", reflecting the idea that ǲwe want different people in different pǳǤOthers, ǡǲif you're a carer say, then 
ǯ      ǳǡ describing these people to be 
experts on that topic. Whilst voiced less readily, and often emerging only after extended discussion 
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of expertise, many participants came to argue  ǲthere are a wide variety of people who are 
experts, so there are lorry drivers that are experts, there are academics who are experts". These points 
reveal that differing types of experience can be seen to qualify someone for expert status. 
Interpreting these findings, there was not a definitive preference for sources of expertise. Whilst 
there was a widespread belief that experts are those with qualifications, there was also (differing 
levels of) support for the idea that experts can possess professional or personal experiential 
knowledgeǤ    ǡ ǯ tomatic assumptions were 
connected with qualifications, and, to a lesser extent, professional experience, but in-depth 
discussion led many to forcefully extol the virtues of personal experience as well. Thinking through 
the implications of these findings, it appears that more expansive understandings that include 
personal knowledge may not have immediate, widespread appeal. This is partly because such  Ǯǯȋǡ Hay and Barr, 2016) or, in other words, 
are not ǮǯǮǯreactions to the issue (Kahnemann, 2011). Cumulatively, this suggests 
that the public are more likely to immediately be drawn to experts as qualified, professionally 
experienced actors, but some citizens may also value other sources of expertise.  
Expert status and partisan affiliation  
Finally, workshop discussion revealed important differences in views around the status of experts 
in relation to parties. As theories of technocratic governance indicate, neutrality and 
depoliticisation can be key aspects of expertsǯ appeal. And yet in the context of parties, alternative 
attributes associated with partisan loyalty and ideological affinity also come into play. Building on 
the desire for experts that provide information and help to formulate policies, it became clear that 
participants held different views about the degree to which experts should be neutral individuals 
who provide expertise to all parties, or should rather be more partisan and work with specific 
parties to advance their ideas. Furthermore, there was ǯ
it was possible for knowledge itself to be neutral, or whether it was inherently value-laden. These 
ideas were often highly entwined, as captured in a particularly indicative discussion:  
ǲ ? ?o you take advice that is based on an objective viewpoint 
or do you take advice that is politically motivated, what is your view?" 
 "Well I would say it should be neutral" 
"Well I would say that advice should come from non-political parties, because 
you are deciding on an issue, you are not deciding on who is more loyal to a party 
agenda, if you really want to solve issues for a whole populace then I think advice 
should come from non-political" 
"I think it could be either...if you are taking political advice then you are taking 
advice from someone who has the interests of your party and is perhaps trying to 
put an alternative view within that contexts". 
This discussion shows the pull of different ideas upon participantsǯ views of experts that, to some 
extent, reflect existing debates about whether experts should be issue-advocates promoting certain 
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  ǡ    Ǯǯ          
gaining additional information (Pielke, 2007). The weight of support for insider and outsider 
experts generally fell in favour of more neutral, independent actors, reflecting the well-established   Ǯǡ ǡ           
scientistǯȋǡ  ? ? ? ?: 1). Whilst some participants (especially in the party activist workshop) 
did argue that ǲǯǯ
ǳ, the majority favoured a hybrid system in which neutral experts offered advice that was 
then interpreted in a partisan way. It was therefore commonly argued that "The experts would be 
external", that "they do need to be independent, non-partisan" and that expertise would be 
"independent", "It has got to be cross party". This approach was seen to be feasible because of the 
way that different parties consume expertise. As the following discussion illustrates:  
ǲ   ?     evidence, because I can present 
technical evidence to the Tory party and the Labour Party but they will interpret 
it in different waysǳ 
"Presumably because they don't have enough expert advice for us to peer review 
ǫǳ 
"No, it is because it is ideological" 
"You see what you want to see because of what you believe". 
Parties themselves were therefore seen to need to navigate the value-status of experts by referring        Ǯǯ Ǥ These preferences offer a steer for 
parties on how to integrate expertise and experts in line with public desires, but there remain ǯideals. 
Discussion 
The above analysis has shown that not only do the public find the idea of experts and expertise to ǡǯǤǡ
want experts to:  
x Provide information and help in formulating policy options; 
x Possess qualifications and professional experience; and 
x Be neutral and independent, with it left to parties to interpret expert advice in line with 
partisan ideas. 
Given our finding that those with concerns about how parties listen to experts are less likely to be 
satisfied with parties, there is reason for parties to consider reacting to these issues. And yet, we 
also found that satisfaction decreased when parties were seen to listen to experts too much. This 
may be because citizens have negative views of experts per se, but it could also be because survey 
respondents were not imagining experts in the same way when they answered the question. As the 
above discussion shows, some types of experts and expertise and viewed more favourably than 
others, hence it could be that dissatisfaction reflected instances in which respondents were 
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      Ǯǯ   Ǥ    ǡ 
survey analysis is required that is unfortunately beyond the scope of this research. However, we 
argue that even if this is the case (and that certain types of expertise are viewed positively by a 
majority of respondents), our findings suggest that parties would find it difficult to capitalise on 
positive views of expertise. 
An immediate challenge is the relationship between public perceptions and party practices. In 
studying how citizens view parties and expertise, there can be a presumption that citizen 
perceptions are accurate and reflect what it is that parties currently do. From this perspective, 
parties simply need to give the people what they want by, for example, creating an independent 
expert panel who would advise on policy development. The difficulty with such logic is that many       ǯ  Ǥ   ǡ 
example, created an economic advisory committee in 2015. Announcing the initiative, the Shadow 
Chancellor, John McDonnell (2015), said the panel allowed Labour to:  ǲ         ǯ 
economic thinkersǥ for their specialist knowledge. I give you this undertaking 
that every policy we propose and every economic instrument we consider for 
use will be rigorously tested to its extreme before we introduce it in 
government.ǳ 
The pǯ  closely mirrors citizensǯ desires, but this example also demonstrates the 
challenges parties face in realising a benefit from such moves. Our findings suggest that many 
citizens are simply unaware of such initiatives Ȃ not a single workshop attendee raised such 
practices, including the political activists Ȃ indicating that perceptions may not match up to what it 
is that parties do. From this perspective parties may need to think about how they communicate 
their activities to citizens.  
Furthermore, in announcing the panel, Labour referenced  Ǯ ǯ  
experts, painting a picture of neutral, academic experts of the kind citizens value. However, political    ȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍ   Ǯǯ   ǯ  
asserting that Labour were  Ǯrecruiting some of the world's most influential left-wing economistsǯ. 
Whilst Labour therefore presented their expert panel in a way that mirrored  ǯ
stated desires, this example reveals that the status of independent and neutral expertise can be 
contested.4  
Building on this point, our research raises further questions about the influences that may colour 
views of how parties use experts. In our survey and workshops, participants were explicitly 
prompted to think about their views of Ǯparties in generalǯ to allow us to map the views of parties as 
a category of organisation. And yet as widely acknowledged, people often answer general questions  ǣ ǲ  ǳ ǲǳǡ least as the latter is liable to be 
                                               
4 Furthering the irony, numerous members of the panel in fact quit, arguing that their points were not 
listened to by the party, see Blanchflower (2016). It is not completely clear, but the panel seems to have been 
indefinitely suspended 
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ǯ. Our research design did not allow us to 
explore the significance of such differences, but building on the discussion above, it could be 
expected that partisan preferences and values may colour who is seen as legitimate, whilst other 
demographic traits could affect the kind of qualifications of experience seen to validate expert 
status. This makes it interesting to ask not only whether citizensǯ views of experts vary in specific 
situations compared to general contexts, but also whether certain attributes and traits inform the 
judgements that citizens make (with one possible explanation for dissatisfaction with parties 
listening too much to experts being the idea that they are listening to the wrong kind of expert). 
Whilst beyond the scope of our own research, this suggests the value of conjoint analysis which, 
using scenario based questions, could analyse the appeal of different expert roles, kinds of expert 
and partisan affiliations when it comes to giving expertise.  
Even if these challenges can be overcome, it remains the case that citizens are not united in their 
views of what is desired from experts and expertise. Whilst there is clear praise for expert 
qualifications and experience alongside general scepticism about giving experts decision-making 
powers, we found that views were not uniform and that people adapted their answers when given 
time to reflect and discuss their ideas. This was particularly the case when it came to experiential 
knowledge as, although originally not cited as a valid kind of expertise, given time, many 
participants came to argue that such inputs were essential, often contradicting their initial stance.  
Given these points, our article raises important questions for parties considering expert-inspired 
reform. Whilst initial survey findings suggest that parties may be able to boost satisfaction by 
listening more to (certain kinds of) experts and expertise, workshop discussions suggest that it is 
far from easy to design processes seen to be legitimate by citizens. Whilst the idea of independent 
experts with qualifications and professional expertise informing and formulating policies is 
attractive, the basis of valid expertise is not uniform and, on closer inspection may be difficult to 
realise.  
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